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CLD-198        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1665 
 ___________ 
 
 ANWAR JAVED, 
       Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                            Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A094-813-777) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Miriam K. Mills 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Respondent‟s Motion for Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 26, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: June 10, 2011 ) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Anwar Javed petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals‟ (“BIA”) 
denial of his motion to reopen, and the Government has filed a motion for summary 
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action.  We will grant the Government‟s motion and deny the petition for review. 
I. 
Javed is a citizen of Pakistan who overstayed his visitor visa.  He initially applied 
for asylum and other relief on the ground that he fears mistreatment in Pakistan on 
account of his Christian religion.  His claims were based primarily on specific threats 
against him by a group of Muslims in his hometown who claimed that he had converted 
to Islam and threatened to kill him for apostasy if he did not stop practicing Christianity.  
Among the evidence he submitted was the 2006 International Religious Freedom Report, 
which describes numerous attacks on Christians.  An Immigration Judge denied Javed‟s 
claims and ordered his removal to Pakistan, and the BIA dismissed his appeal in 2008.  
We denied his petition for review because he had failed to corroborate his claims.  See 
Javed v. Att‟y Gen., 376 F. App‟x 227 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 Javed then filed the motion to reopen with the BIA at issue here.  He filed it more 
than ninety days after the BIA‟s previous ruling, so it was untimely unless he 
demonstrated that it was based on “changed country conditions” in Pakistan.  8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(c)(7)(C)((ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  Javed argued that conditions for 
Christians had worsened in general, and he attached various newspaper articles and more 
recent country reports.  The BIA concluded that Javed‟s new evidence shows only 
conditions similar to those at the time of his previous hearing and denied his motion as 
untimely.  It also declined to exercise its discretion to reopen sua sponte.  Javed petitions 
for review. 
II. 
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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  We review the BIA‟s denial of 
reopening for abuse of discretion and may not disturb its ruling unless it is “„arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.‟”  Zheng v. Att‟y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citation omitted).  In doing so, we review the BIA‟s underlying assessment of the record 
for substantial evidence.  Liu v. Att‟y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2009).  We 
perceive no abuse of discretion here.
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Javed argued before the BIA that his new evidence shows changed conditions 
because it reports an increase in violence against Christians and governmental inaction 
which, coupled with discriminatory laws, has created “an atmosphere of impunity” for 
those attacks to continue.  In rejecting that argument, the BIA compared Javed‟s new 
evidence with that already of record, including the 2006 country report (which it referred 
to by its designation as Exhibit 3 in the prior proceeding).  The 2006 country report states 
that “[a]cts of violence and harassment against Christians continued during the period 
covered by this report” and goes on to report numerous acts of murder and other violence 
against Christians.  (2006 Report at 1, 9-10, 12, 15-17) (A.R. 173, 181-82, 184, 187-89).  
It also reports the Pakistani Government‟s frequent inaction in the face of such attacks 
and notes that “discriminatory legislation and the teaching of religious intolerance in 
public schools creates a permissive environment for [those] attacks.”  (Id. at 15) (A.R. 
187).   
                                                 
1
 Javed has not challenged the BIA‟s denial of reopening sua sponte, and we lack 
jurisdiction to review such rulings in the absence of considerations that do not 
apply here.  See Pllumi v. Att‟y Gen., — F.3d —, No. 09-4454, 2011 WL 
1278741, at *3 & n.7 (3d Cir. Apr. 6, 2011). 
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Javed‟s new evidence does not compel the conclusion that conditions in Pakistan 
have changed since then.  Javed submitted eighty-three pages of documents in support of 
his motion.  The articles he submitted describe specific incidents of attacks on Christians.  
Those incidents are troubling, but they are substantially similar to those described in the 
2006 country report.  (Mot. to Reopen, Exhs. A through J) (A.R. 63-96).  The more 
recent country reports are substantially in accord as well.  (Id., Exhs. K through M) (A.R. 
98-146). 
Javed argues that the BIA gave this evidence inadequate consideration, but we 
disagree.  The BIA specifically discussed several of Javed‟s documents, accurately 
summarized his evidence as a whole, and adequately explained why it does not show 
changed country conditions.  See Liu, 555 F.3d at 149 (reviewing BIA ruling containing 
“the type of findings that are sufficient under Zheng”).  Javed also faults the BIA‟s 
reliance on a statement in a 2010 report that the Pakistani Government had taken steps to 
protect the rights of religious minorities.  Javed acknowledges that the report does indeed 
contain “positive information,” but argues that the BIA focused on this single statement 
while “ignoring” the rest of his evidence.  The BIA plainly did not do so.  Instead, it 
relied on that statement by way of balancing a 2009 report that noted “an increase in 
violence against minorities during the year” in general.  (Mot. to Reopen, Ex. M, at 16) 
(A.R. 132).  The BIA expressly considered that general reference and, viewed in the 
context of the evidence as a whole, it does not compel the conclusion that conditions in 
Pakistan have changed.   
Finally, Javed argues that “[t]he current state of religious freedom is abysmal and 
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the Board finding to the contrary has the slender reed of a single paragraph in the record 
to support it.”  Javed‟s motion, however, did not call on the BIA to decide whether the 
situation in Pakistan is “abysmal,” and the BIA did not do so.  Instead, it concluded only 
that conditions had not substantially changed since Javed‟s prior hearing.  None of 
Javed‟s evidence compels the contrary conclusion.   
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.  
